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On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: 
Wittgenstein’s Response to Kohler
Naomi Eilan
Wittgenstein formulates the paradox of gestalt switches thus: 
‘What is incomprehensible is that nothing, and yet everything  has 
changed, after all. That is the only way to put it’. In the course of 
isolating what I take to be the best of the various solutions to the 
paradox explored by Wittgenstein, the following claims are de-
fended. (a) A significant strand in Wittgenstein’s own formulation 
of, and solution to, the paradox can best be understood as a re-
sponse to three specific claims made by the Gestalt psychologist 
Kohler. (b) The most promising avenue Wittgenstein explored in 
his many attempts to resolve the paradox gives perceptual atten-
tion a constitutive role in the solution (c) This role is best elabo-
rated, partially, by appeal to information processing theories of 
attention. (d) There are good reasons to think that the kind of solu-
tion to the paradox this yields would have been welcomed by 
Wittgenstein. 
On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: 
Wittgenstein’s Response to Kohler
Naomi Eilan
What is incomprehensible is that nothing,  and yet everything has 
changed, after all. That is the only way to put it. Surely this way is 
wrong: it has not changed in one respect but has in another.  There 
would be nothing strange about that… (RPP II, §474).
1. Introduction
Consider the following figures.
The first, the ‘duck-rabbit’, can flip backwards and forwards be-
tween being seen as a duck and as a rabbit; the second, the 
‘double-cross’, between being seen as a white cross against a black 
background, and a black cross against a white background; and 
the third, the ‘Rubin-vase’, between being seen as a vase and as 
two profiles. These are classical examples of the kind of ambigu-
ous pictures that the Gestaltists used to drive home the impor-
tance of a phenomenon that previous psychologists working on 
vision had, they thought, overlooked, the phenomenon of ‘organi-
zation’. Wittgenstein described such switches as switches or 
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3
changes of ‘aspect’, and used the term ‘organizational aspects’, in 
deference to the Gestaltists, to describe switches like the second 
and third. The latter are the ‘Gestalt switches’ in the title, and are 
the kind of aspect switches that will be our concern in what fol-
lows.
The ‘paradox’ above is, according to Wittgenstein, an expres-
sion of what we want to say, in the first instance, when reflecting 
on the phenomenology of all aspect switches, including non-
organizational ones. But highlighting the paradox is also the first 
step in Wittgenstein’s response to the Gestaltists’ theoretical 
treatment of organizational phenomena, figure/ground segrega-
tion being one important instance of these. In particular, he held 
that several specific theoretical claims made by Kohler falsified the 
phenomenological datum, as expressed by the paradox. One exe-
getical proposal I will be making is that a great deal of what Witt-
genstein has to say on aspect switching, and on ‘seeing as’ in gen-
eral, falls into place if we treat Kohler as the interlocutor. In the 
Investigations he is mostly unnamed as such, but in other writings 
there are frequent references to him, in the course of relentless, re-
peated attempts to come to grips with the phenomenon.
 The interest in focusing on Wittgenstein’s relation with Kohler 
goes beyond exegesis, though. One thing to emerge from tracing 
the roots of his remarks on aspect switches back to responses to 
specific claims made by Kohler, is, I will be suggesting, an ap-
proach to the relation between philosophy and psychology which 
differs substantively both from many current approaches, and 
from that conventionally ascribed to Wittgenstein himself. With 
respect to the former: on a view made famous by David Chalmers, 
we have two independent concepts of perception in general and 
vision in particular—a psychological, functional one, and a purely 
phenomenal one. The ‘hard problem’ of consciousness is how to 
make sense of the location of the referents of the second in the 
natural world. The approach that emerges from Wittgenstein’s 
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treatment of the phenomenon of aspect switches is radically dif-
ferent. On this view, our concept of vision ‘leaves a tangled im-
pression’, there are similarities and differences and complicated 
relations between different ingredients in it, and the hard problem 
here is that we do not command an overview of these complicated 
inter-relationships. As I see it, this would apply with a vengeance 
to the relation between phenomenally-informed ingredients in our 
everyday concept of ‘seeing’, on the one hand, and ‘vision’, as 
used in current work in vision science, on the other. The hard 
problem, on this approach, is a meta-problem of finding our way 
around our concepts, rather than a metaphysical one stemming 
from a clear division among them. Or, rather, if there is a meta-
physical problem, it is somewhere down the line from the more 
urgent conceptual one. 
As to interpretations of Wittgenstein: the Investigations ends, 
famously, with the claim that the ‘confusion and barrenness in 
psychology’ is not down to it’s being a ‘young science’. What will 
emerge in discussion is that at least some of the confusions Witt-
genstein was battling against were, precisely, down to the youth of 
the science at the time he was writing. To say this, though, is not to 
say that the conceptual issues have simply disappeared. But it is to 
say they have changed as a result of empirical developments. In 
saying this, I take myself to be adopting Wittgenstein’s own gen-
eral attitude to the relation between philosophy and psychology, 
and it is this that I think is of lasting value, independently of his 
very interesting substantive comments on aspects. To view Witt-
genstein in this way is, of course, to go against the grain of much 
commentary on Wittgenstein. I will not try to rebut the opposing 
view head-on, but hope that both the details of his debate with 
Kohler, and a particular solution I will propose for his puzzle, 
which draws on current work in psychology, will help to give a 
sense of why I think this is wrong.1
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section I briefly 
summarise key points made by the Gestaltists, Kohler in particu-
lar, and isolate three claims Kohler made that were of particular 
interest to Wittgenstein. In the subsequent two sections I set out 
Wittgenstein’s response to them, and then go on to show how he 
used the tools deployed against Kohler to address the paradox. 
More specifically, in these sections the suggestion will be that key 
conceptual distinctions he makes between different senses of ‘see’ 
are motivated by his response to what he takes to be Kohler’s fail-
ure to do justice to the paradox. 
As we shall see, though, this only takes us so far in under-
standing what Wittgenstein was trying to do with organizational 
aspects. The specific suggestion pursued in the second half of the 
paper is that in his attempts to grapple with the phenomenon, he 
went well beyond these conceptual distinctions and introduced 
substantive claims about the nature of organizational aspects, and 
their difference from other phenomenal properties of experience. 
Or, rather, he put forward for consideration several distinct ap-
proaches to these differences, never settling on one account. One 
particularly interesting suggestion he makes is that aspects are 
linked to attention in a way other phenomenal properties of expe-
rience are not, and that this is key, somehow, to solving the para-
dox. My chief suggestion will be that there is a way of developing 
this idea into a solution to the paradox which, though distinct, in-
deed almost the reverse from any that might plausibly be attrib-
uted to Wittgenstein, draws critically on some of his insights. It 
also draws critically on current work in psychology of a kind not 
available to him at the time he was writing, but which, in my view, 
he would have welcomed. 
Before beginning, to set the tone for the exegetical part of the 
paper, and to get a measure of how deep Wittgenstein’s preoccu-
pation with Kohler was, I want to have before us the following 
two sets of quotes, from Kohler and Wittgenstein respectively. 
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I. Kohler
(In physics) it is often difficult to discover the most important facts 
because they are hidden…It seems to me that in psychology the 
greatest obstacle is quite the opposite. Often we do not observe the 
most important psychological facts because they are too common-
place, because their presence at every moment of our lives blinds us 
to them. (Kohler 1929, 148)
‘Most of the observations of Gestalt psychology are of this kind: They 
touch on facts of such general occurrence in our everyday life that we 
have difficulty in seeing anything remarkable in them.’ (Kohler 1930, 
146)2
II.  Wittgenstein
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden be-
cause of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice 
something—because it is always before one’s eyes).  The real founda-
tions of his inquiry do not strike a man at all.  Unless that fact has at 
some time struck him. — And this means: we fail to be struck by 
what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (PI, §129)
We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find 
the whole business of seeing puzzling enough. (PI IIxi, 213)
Despite the deep echo, Kohler is not mentioned in the immediate 
context of the quotes from Wittgenstein.  The remarks are too 
close, though, to be sheer coincidence, in particular as there is 
much evidence that Wittgenstein was preoccupied with Kohler 
when these comments were written. Of course, in Wittgenstein’s 
hands they took on a different flavour. One very crude way of 
summarising the relation between Kohler’s and Wittgenstein’s 
versions is that, without acknowledging their source, Wittgenstein 
is turning their import against the Gestaltists themselves. They 
stray, he thinks, from pressing on and on with the familiar, missing 
some of its truly puzzling features, partly by making a move that 
dissolves the paradox before it gets going, thereby missing out on 
the illumination that can be gained from facing it head on. 
Before setting out the details of Wittgenstein’s response to 
Kohler, a word of caution. There are, according to Wittgenstein, 
many different types of aspects, introduced largely recessively, via 
different requirements on noticing changes in aspect. Some such 
noticings require concepts, others do not; some require familiarity 
with past instances, others do not; some require imagination, oth-
ers do not, and so forth. Given this variation, there is no reason to 
expect there to be a single, uniform account of the role of aspects 
in seeing, nor that what is interesting about aspects is the same in 
all cases. It patently isn’t. Our concern will be exclusively with 
‘organizational aspects’. Wittgenstein says of these, variously, that 
they are ‘purely optical’, ‘primitive’ (PI IIxi, 208)  (both terms used 
by Kohler, incidentally), ‘almost automatic—it is as if an image 
filters across the perception’, and ‘fundamental’ (LW, §698). The 
suggestions I will be making henceforth about Wittgenstein’s ap-
proach to aspects and his worries about them, apply to these only, 
in particular to figure/grounds segmentations. There are addi-
tional, fascinating and partially overlapping problems raised by 
conceptually-informed aspects, but I will have nothing to say 
about these.
2. Kohler on visual perception
According to Koffka, one of the founding fathers of the Gestalt 
movement, ‘the problem for theories of visual perception is to ad-
dress the question: why do things looks as they do?’ The first step 
in this enterprise is to get right our description of how things look. 
The Gestaltists’ chief target on this front were the structuralists or 
introspectionists, Titchner and his followers, whose description of 
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how things look was according to the Gestaltists, fundamentally 
misconceived. On these theories, the elements of visual experience 
correspond one-to-one to points of retinal stimulation, and it is 
these elements that determine how things look. The ‘constancy 
hypothesis’ they endorsed says that experience, in its pure form, 
remains constant so long as retinal stimulation remains constant. 
Everything else we commonly include in our descriptions of how 
things look, in which we employ concepts that refer to the external 
world, is the product of association and interpretation. Given the 
pervasiveness of the latter, therefore, in order to detect these units 
subjects need to be trained in the practice of pure, specialized in-
trospection, which removes all meaning, interpretation and asso-
ciation from their experience.
It is this division between sensations that mark our ‘pure expe-
rience’, on the one hand, and interpretation on the other, that was 
the Gestaltists’ target. With respect to sensations, the Gestaltists 
held that ‘[the] sensations of introspective analysis are parts exist-
ing only in construction and theory’ (Kohler 1929, 183). As to the 
jump from sensation to interpretation, what is missed out, they 
held, is a level of phenomenal reality which cannot be accounted 
for either by appeal to sensations or by appeal to interpretation. 
More specifically, what this division obscures from view is the way 
in which as a matter of phenomenal fact ‘[i]n most visual fields the 
contents of certain areas “belong together”, so that we have cir-
cumscribed, or bounded, units before us, from which the sur-
roundings are excluded’ (Kohler 1929, 149).
The ‘belongings together’ that they set out to describe fall into 
two classes: the grouping phenomena, e.g. when dispersed dots 
can seem to be grouped into rows or columns, and figure/ground 
segmentation. The latter is the one that concerned Wittgenstein 
most, so a few words on how the notion of ‘belonging together’ 
applies here may be useful.
Consider the Rubin vase. You can see it either as a vase, or as 
two profiles, but never as both at the same time. That this is so is 
the consequence of the way in which lines in the visual region ‘be-
long’ to the area that is perceived as figure. In current psychology 
this phenomenon is often referred to as ‘border ownership’ or the 
‘one sidedness of edges’. One method Rubin used to drive this 
home has since been much replicated and refined. Subjects are first 
shown ambiguous figure/ground pictures and subsequently 
shown unambiguous pictures of the shape either of the back-
ground or of the figure in the original pictures. While they are eas-
ily able to reidentify shapes of areas originally seen as figures, 
there is complete failure to do so for shapes of areas initially seen 
as ground—the lines count as borders of shapes only for the areas 
picked out as figure. (See Baylis and Driver 1995 for developments 
and refinements). 
These were the kinds of phenomenal features the Gestaltists 
were drawing attention to with their battle cry of ‘back to the fa-
miliar’—features so pervasive, they held, that no-one had noticed 
them. There are three particular ingredients in Kohler's way of de-
veloping the case for treating these features as fundamental, which 
I will label for convenience, and which are central to understand-
ing Wittgenstein’s response to Kohler. I set them out in this sec-
tion, and in subsequent sections consider Wittgenstein’s response 
to them, as background both to his formulation and to his disarm-
ing of the paradox.
(1) The New Object Claim
Consider again the Rubin vase. The introspectionists would say 
that experientially, given that the point-by-point stimulation re-
mains the same before and after the switch, there is no difference 
between the constituents of the experience in the two cases. The 
difference is, therefore, one of association or interpretation. It was 
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partly in order to rule out this kind of response that Kohler in-
sisted that in each case we are faced with a new visual object. There 
is nothing carried over, visually speaking, to be interpreted differ-
ently. As he puts it:
So long as we really have the first one, i.e., as existing in vision, the 
other will be absorbed in the general surroundings, which optically 
have no real form at the time. When the second form becomes a visual 
reality, the first disappears. (Kohler 1929, 198)
In a case he uses to drive home this point, which Wittgenstein 
picks up on, in which one might flip from seeing Italy against the 
background of the Mediterranean, to seeing the sea as an object 
(with an unfamiliar shape) and Italy as part of the background, he 
says that when such flips occur one is experiencing ‘one concrete, 
real form and then another’ (Kohler 1929, 196). If this is the correct 
description of what is happening, then, as intended to be read by 
Kohler, the introspectionists’ claim is wrong—there is nothing vis-
ual in common between the first and the second perceptual expe-
rience. 
(2) The Pure Vision Claim
Upon the present time there has been a tendency to regard the re-
markable properties of wholes as the achievement of ‘higher’ proc-
esses. From the viewpoint of Gestalt theory, however, sensory organi-
zation is as natural and primitive a fact as any other side of sensory 
dynamics. (Kohler 1929, 216)
It was in this context that the Gestaltists claimed that groupings 
and segregations are independent of ‘meaning’, concepts, back-
ground knowledge about familiar objects, and so forth, denying 
thereby what the introspectionists would have said about them. 
According to the Gestaltists, the organizational phenomena are 
‘primitive’ and ‘purely visual’. As a demonstration of this Kohler 
refers us to cases in which organization occurs even though we 
have no idea what the object is that is singled out. (See, e.g. Kohler 
1929, 152).
(3) The New Concept Claim
According to Kohler, in order to do justice to what he described as 
‘visual reality’ we need a new set of concepts, namely those of ‘or-
ganization’ and ‘belonging together’, concepts appropriate to this 
reality only, in contrast both to those needed for describing the 
physical world, and to those used by the introspectionists to de-
scribe the visual array, namely those of ‘punctate sensation’, 
‘point-to-point point matching’, etc. 
All three claims occupied Wittgenstein (though not under 
these labels). Very roughly, his complaint against the Gestaltists 
can be summarised as follows. The New Object Claim results in 
falsifying the basic phenomenological datum, the paradoxical na-
ture of aspect switching. Most of the blame for the New Object 
Claim is laid at the door of the Pure Vision Claim, though the New 
Concept Claim plays its part too. Moreover, the materials needed 
for showing what is wrong with the Pure Vision Claim are pre-
cisely those we need for disarming the paradox. In the next two 
sections I look at his complaints against the Gestaltists’ first two 
claims in more detail, and then return to his own way of dealing 
with the paradox. The New Concept Claim will be picked up later 
on.
3. Wittgenstein on the New Object Claim
When one fails to recognize the Mediterranean on the map with dif-
ferent colouring, that does not show that there is really a different vis-
ual object before one (Kohler’s example). (RPP I, §1035)
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Well, perhaps it doesn’t. But what is wrong with describing what 
is going on in this way? Wittgenstein has two main objections. The 
first and simplest, which I will call the Objection from Phenome-
nology, just is a statement of the paradox: ‘What is incomprehen-
sible is that nothing, and yet everything has changed, after all. That 
is the only way to put it…’. If we say we are seeing two different 
objects, one before and one after the switch, we distort an element 
of the phenomenology of aspect switches that Wittgenstein re-
gards as essential to it. As we stare at the Rubin vase, say, flipping 
from perceiving the vase to perceiving the two profiles, one thing 
that is certain is that we are aware that in some basic sense the ob-
ject we are perceiving has not changed, which is precisely what the 
postulation of a new, post-switch object does not allow for.
Wittgenstein appears to regard this feature of aspect switches 
as non-negotiable. His attempts to disarm the paradox, therefore, 
and to account for what is happening when aspects switch, focus 
almost exclusively on getting right the second half of the paradox, 
the sense we have that everything has changed. It is these ‘every-
things’ that he labels the ‘aspects’, a subspecies of which are the 
organizational aspects the Gestaltists were interested in.
The second objection to the New Object Claim, which follows 
on from the first, emerges in his critique of the way Kohler makes 
the case for the New Concept Claim. In the course of making his 
case against the introspectionists, Kohler says: 
At a given time some concrete forms are simply there in vision, no 
less than colours and brightness. (Kohler 1930, 150) 
To which Wittgenstein responds:
‘Object’ and ‘ground’ —Kohler wants to say — are visual concepts, 
like red and round. The description of what is seen includes mention-
ing what is object and what is ground no less than colour and shape. 
And the description is just as incomplete when it isn’t said what is 
object and what ground, as it is when colour and shape are not given. 
I see the one as immediately as the other - one wants to say. And what 
objection is there to make on this? (RPP, §1023) 
A major objection Wittgenstein considers is this:
 If you put the ‘organization’ of a visual impression on a level with 
colours and shapes, you are proceeding from the idea of the visual 
impression as an inner object. Of course this make this object into a 
chimera; a queerly shifting construction. … (PI IIxi, 196)
 The reasoning here, I think, is something like the following. If you 
put the change in organization on a level with change in colour or 
shape you will need to postulate two distinct objects of perception, 
one for before and one for after the switch. For, just as an object 
cannot have two shapes or be two different colours all over at the 
same time, so it cannot have two organizations at the same time, if 
organization is treated in the same way as colour and shape are. 
Wittgenstein’s claim then is that Kohler is led to postulate two in-
ner objects because part of the phenomenology of aspect switching 
is that we see, when noticing an aspect change, that the external 
object hasn’t changed, so we need different objects, something 
other than the external objects, to be the immediate objects of vi-
sion, the bearers of the changed organizational properties. And 
Wittgenstein’s complaint here follows on from the first. The un-
changingness of the external object is an essential component of 
the phenomenology of aspect change. To throw it away is to 
change the subject and to elide the hard question about the famil-
iar phenomenon in question: how to explain the radical changes 
that our phenomenology seems to undergo while holding onto the 
sameness of the object as perceived. There is no denying the natu-
ralness of describing the experience as one in which the object 
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changes before one’s very eyes (LW I, §597). But that this is so is 
part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. 
4. Wittgenstein on The Pure Vision Claim: 
The Conceptual Turn
It is possible to distinguish three stages in Wittgenstein’s response 
to the Pure Vision Claim. I discuss the first two here, and the third 
in the next section, when looking at his solution to the paradox.
(1) The first step is to concede the complete naturalness of describ-
ing changes in organization as visual. 
If someone says:  “I am talking about a visual phenomenon, in which 
the visual picture, that is, its organization, does change, although 
shapes and colours remain the same” —then I must answer him: “I 
know what you are talking about. I too should like to say that”.
 But to say that is not to concede much. For if that is all there is to 
it, then 
If you only shake yourself from physiological prejudices, you will 
find nothing queer about the fact that the glance of the eye can be 
seen too. For I also say that I see the look that you cast at someone 
else. And if someone wanted to correct me and say that I don’t really 
see it, I should take that for pure stupidity. (Zettel, 223)
Or, as he puts it elsewhere, ‘It is [in such cases]—contrary to Koh-
ler—precisely a meaning I see’ (RPP I, §869). The point is that not 
much can be extracted from the naturalness of using ‘see’ in any 
particular connection. We use ‘see’ for many kinds of experiences 
which take all kinds of different ‘objects’. The key here is in the 
continuation of the Zettel passage just quoted. After saying it 
would be stupid to deny one can see glances, he writes:
On the other hand I have not made any admissions by using that man-
ner of speaking, and I should contradict anyone who told me I saw 
the glance ‘just the way’ I see the shape and colour of the eye.
For ‘naive languages’, that is to say our naïve, normal way of ex-
pressing ourselves, does not contain any theory but only the concept 
of seeing. 
The first point, then, is this. No theory about the nature of vision 
and/or its ‘real’ objects can be extracted from the naturalness of 
our using the concept of ‘seeing’ in various connections. 
(2) In the passage in which he concedes the naturalness of talking 
about changes in organization as visual changes, Wittgenstein in-
troduces his next move. 
So I am not saying, “Yes, the phenomenon we are both talking about 
is actually a change of organization…” but rather “Yes, this talk of 
change of organization etc. is an expression of the experience which I 
mean too.”
Similarly, the continuation of the section in which he says Kohler 
is wrong to say that the switch in aspects when viewing the map 
of the Mediterranean means that we have two objects, he says the 
following:
 At most that might give a plausible ground for a particular way of ex-
pressing oneself. For it is not the same to say “That shews that here 
there are two ways of seeing”: —and “Under these circumstances it 
would be better to speak of ‘two different objects of sight’”.
Finally, the passage in which the paradox is introduced ends with 
these words:
But “Nothing has changed” means: Although I have no right to 
change my report about what I saw, since I see the same things now 
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as before - still,  I am incomprehensibly compelled to report com-
pletely different things, one after another.
The move he is making in all three cases is neatly summarised in 
the following two passages:
“But this isn’t seeing !”—“But this is seeing!” It must be possible to 
give both remarks a conceptual justification. (PI IIxi, 230)
“Is it a genuine visual experience?” Here it is difficult to see that what is 
at issue is the fixing of concepts.  A concept forces itself on one. (This is 
what you must not forget) (PI IIxi, 204)
The positive, substantive point he is making here, distinct from the 
first, is this. At least some of the Gestaltists’ debates with the intro-
spectionists appear to rest on claims about what ‘seeing’ means, 
rather than being empirical debates about the nature of the phe-
nomena they are describing. But that this is so is difficult to see. 
And the reason it is difficult is that if there is anything more famil-
iar than the experiences that the Gestaltists describe, aspects of 
which we tend to ignore precisely because of their familiarity, it is 
the concepts we use to describe them, which we simply ‘look 
through’ in debating the nature of the phenomena they refer to. 
Obviously, such transparency is essential for thought and talk to 
so much as get going. But there are occasions when it is actually 
the very concepts we are looking through, rather than the phenom-
ena we are using them to look at, that are the cause of the problem, 
the unnoticed topic of debate. Our first move in examining the Ge-
staltists’ account of the phenomena of aspect switching should be 
to step back and see which of their disputes with the introspec-
tionists are due to emphasizing different ingredients in our con-
cept of ‘seeing’.
5. Solving the Paradox: The Conceptual Turn Put to Work
Summing up his strategy for dealing with debates about what is 
the domain of the purely visual Wittgenstein writes:
The question what do you see? gets for an answer a variety of kinds 
of description. - If now someone says: “After all,  I see the aspect, the 
organization, just as much as I see shapes and colours” —what is that 
supposed to mean? That one includes all that in ‘seeing’? Or that here 
there is the greatest similarity? And what can I say to that matter? I 
can point out similarities and differences. (RPP I, §964)
Once we turn our attention to the concepts we use, once we take 
the conceptual turn, we can begin to notice similarities and differ-
ences between different specific uses of ‘see’. The passage that 
opens the discussion of seeing in PI II announces simultaneously a 
diagnosis of a specific conceptual mistake Wittgenstein thinks 
Kohler is making, and a potential, semi-formal solution to the 
paradox.
Two uses of the word “see”.
The one: “What do you see there?”—“I see  (and then a description, 
a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness between these two 
faces”—let the man I am telling this to be seeing the faces as clearly as 
I do myself.
The importance of this is the difference of category between the two 
‘objects’ of sight. (PI IIxi, 193)
One example of many of the application of this distinction is this:
If I saw the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, then I saw: these shapes and col-
ours (I give them in detail)—and I saw besides something like this: 
and here I point to a number of different pictures of rabbits.—This 
shows the difference between the concepts. (PI IIxi, 196/7)
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Let us call the first sense of ‘see’ ‘object seeing’ and the second 
‘aspect seeing’. Then, in these terms, Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of 
Kohler’s New Object Claim is this. What makes Kohler say that 
we are confronted with a new concrete visual object after the 
switch is the complete naturalness of saying that we see the new 
organization, and hence, that it must be borne by a new concrete 
object. Wittgenstein’s succinct reply is that when we find it natural 
to say that we see the organization we are using ‘see’ in the second 
sense: the ‘object’ we are seeing is not a concrete individual but an 
abstract likeness. Though this is certainly an experience, it has 
thought in it. According to Wittgenstein, what is happening when 
Kohler insists we see a new object for each aspect is that ‘one kind 
of concept is making trouble for another’ (RPP II, §444).
It seems clear that one of Wittgenstein’s main reasons for fo-
cusing on this relatively rare experience is that it is the kind of ex-
perience Kohler appealed to in making his case for the claim that 
we see new objects when changes in organization occur. Wittgen-
stein devotes much time to agreeing with him that ‘seeing as’ is 
not interpretation—we can come to see a triangle as standing on its 
apex, we don’t just decide to interpret it in this way, but argues 
that the dichotomy between seeing and interpreting blinds us to 
the existence of a concept, and a phenomenon it refers to, that is 
neither interpretation nor simple seeing, but akin to both. ‘The 
concept lies between that of seeing and thinking, that is…bears a 
resemblance to both; and the phenomena…are akin to those of 
seeing and thinking’ (RPP II, §462). “‘Seeing as” is not part of per-
ception. And for that reason it is like seeing and again not like…If 
you are having the visual experience …[of a dawning of an aspect] 
you are also thinking of what you see’ (PI IIxi, 197). Or, as the puts 
it elsewhere ‘here we must be careful not to think in traditional 
psychological categories, such as simply dividing experience into 
seeing and thinking; or doing anything like that’ (LW, §542).3 
Turning now to the paradox, it is tempting to see pp. 196-200 
of PI IIxi as an application of the distinction between the two uses 
of ‘see’ to the paradox. Applying the distinction, we get something 
like the following semi-formal resolution of it. When I say that 
nothing has changed in what I see, I am using ‘see’ in the first 
sense, and I mean that the physical object, as seen, and its appar-
ent shape and colours, have not changed. When I say that every-
thing has changed in what I see, I am using ‘see’ in the second 
sense, and what has changed is that now I have a new kind of ex-
perience, overlaying the first, in which I see, in this second sense, a 
likeness, or what Wittgenstein in other places calls ‘an internal re-
lation’ to an object-type or property. (As in, e.g., ‘—but what I per-
ceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of the object, 
but an internal relation between it and other objects’ (PI IIxi,  212). 
When the picture flips back again, I continue seeing the object, in 
the first sense, but have a new aspect-seeing experience, in which I 
‘see’, in this second sense, a different similarity. 
6. Going Beyond the Conceptual Turn
Were Wittgenstein wholly satisfied with this form of solution to 
the paradox this might have been the end of the story; paradox 
resolved and Kohler’s mistake diagnosed— and we would not 
have had pages and pages of him worrying away at the phenome-
non itself. But the fact is that we do have these pages, and what we 
find in them is something that goes well beyond pointing out a 
confusion between two senses of ‘see’. The general form of the 
worry they give voice to might be introduced by imagining the 
following response from Kohler. 
Suppose it is right that when an aspect dawns and one says 
that one sees a new organization, one is using ‘see’ in its second 
sense. Suppose even, for the sake of argument, that the diagnosis 
of the mistake underlying the New Object Claim is accepted. On 
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the face of it, this move, as so far described, leaves a major issue 
unaddressed, namely what we say about the experiences that pre-
cede this kind of reflective awareness. And it is with respect to this 
question that Kohler would have claimed that there are real phe-
nomenal changes that occur prior to the dawning of an aspect, 
which have not been accounted for and which are, moreover, 
those that concerned him (for example the switch from object-
seeing a white cross against a black ground to object-seeing a black 
cross against a white one). His second point would be that the cor-
rect description of the phenomenology of each of these preceding 
experiences must refer to the different organizational aspects of 
each. For example in the case of the double cross, in one experi-
ence the borders belong to the black area of the picture, in the 
other to the white. That is, it is true of each experience of object-
seeing that we must refer to its distinctive organizational proper-
ties in doing justice to its phenomenology. Finally, Kohler may 
well have continued, when we have the kind of reflective experi-
ence Wittgenstein describes, to which he refers using the second 
sense of ‘see’, it is the fact that these earlier experiences have two 
different organizations that makes it the case that one rather than 
another phenomenal similarity is salient to the subject, and it is 
such similarities, made salient by organizational properties, that 
get noticed when an aspect dawns. 
To say all of this is to say, at least, that there is prior phenome-
nal change that falls within the scope of what he refers to as ‘object 
seeing’.  Call this the Prior Change Claim. Suppose it is true, the 
challenge then is this. If it is wrong to say that these distinct organ-
izational properties are borne by different objects, we need a dif-
ferent account of how they enter into the phenomenology of ordi-
nary object seeing.
Now, on one way of reading Wittgenstein, arguably suggested 
by the texts we have been examining, he would have given a radi-
cally reductive response to this challenge, and simply denied the 
Prior Change Claim. On this approach, organizational features, 
considered as ingredients in phenomenology, come in only post 
hoc, as part of the experience of an aspect dawning, and should be 
referred to only as part of the account of what it is to undergo this 
kind of experience. Reference to organizational properties and to 
real changes therein has no role at all to play in specifying the 
phenomenology of simple object-seeing. 
While this kind of response may fit in with the general tenor of 
his response to Kohler, as so far outlined, and with general moves 
Wittgenstein makes elsewhere in the philosophy of mind, his re-
peated attempts to deal with organizational phenomena suggest, 
at the very least, that he wavered between it and adoption of the 
Prior Change Claim and the related attempt to meet the challenge 
that ensues. More specifically, as I read him, he appears in many 
places to hold that the Gestaltists were onto something with their 
New Concept Claim, which says that there are concepts, in par-
ticular that of ‘belonging together’, that apply, in some way, to 
visual experiences of objects, not in virtue of properties of the ex-
ternal physical object, as perceived. If anything, he thought that 
the Gestaltists were not baffled enough by how to explain their 
applicability to experience. For once we rid them of a distinctive 
internal object as a bearer, as he argues we should, there is a deep 
puzzle as to what to do with them, how to explain both what they 
are and how they contribute to the phenomenology of vision. This 
is a puzzle that, as we shall see, continued to occupy Wittgenstein 
in a way that can best be explained by seeing him as taking seri-
ously, if only for the sake of argument, something like the Prior 
Change Claim.
What about that which remains the same? Wittgenstein re-
peatedly says that when we experience a switch in organizational 
aspect, shape and colour remain constant. This ingredient in Witt-
genstein’s approach is well brought out by Malcolm Budd, who 
writes that in the case of aspect switching that interested Wittgen-
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stein, ‘the appearance of the item does not seem to change with 
respect to colour, two- or three-dimensional shape, distance or dis-
tance of any of its parts from the perceiver. It is because the ap-
pearance of the item does not change in any of these ways that the 
transition from seeing it one way to seeing it another way is puz-
zling’ (Budd 1989, 89).
Here too, though, two possible readings may be distinguished. 
On one, it is only post hoc, in the experience of the dawning of an 
aspect, referred to by the second use of ‘see’, that one comes up, on 
experiential reflection, with the idea of a common phenomenally 
presented object which retains the same shape throughout all the 
changes. In particular, the shapes and colours that remain the 
same are constructed post hoc, for example by appeal to the distri-
bution of lines and colour patches in the double cross case. On the 
other reading, which we may label the Prior Sameness Claim, it is 
a phenomenological fact about the experiences of object-seeing 
that precede the dawning of an aspect, that the object, its shape 
and colours, as presented, remain the same throughout changes in 
aspect. When an aspect dawns we become aware of that fact too, 
as opposed to constructing it post hoc. 
Obviously, once we have before us the distinction between 
prior and post hoc readings of both the sameness and change 
claims, various combinations are possible, both in their own right, 
as responses to the paradox, and as interpretations of Wittgen-
stein. I will not attempt here to consider all possible permutations, 
in either respect. For the purposes of the issues I want to pursue in 
this paper, I will consider texts that support the attribution to 
Wittgenstein of both the Prior Change and Prior Sameness claims. 
And, in order to focus discussion, it will help to read the combina-
tion of the Prior Change and Prior Sameness claims as an en-
dorsement of the following two additional claims. 
The first is a claim to the effect that we need a two-tier account 
of the phenomenology of at least some cases of everyday object 
seeing, an aspectual/organizational tier and a non-aspectual tier. 
One kind of aspect is organizational and this is the one that will 
concern us. The non-aspectual tier include shape and colour, I will 
focus mainly on the former. Call this the ‘Two-Tier Claim’. The 
second is the idea that apparent colour, and, most interestingly, 
shape, remain (really) constant when organizational aspects 
change. Call this the Constancy Claim. 
In the remaining sections of the paper, I examine links be-
tween, on the one hand, various passages in Wittgenstein that 
might be read as attempts to develop both claims (though not un-
der that description) and, on the other, current and past work on 
related problems in psychology—leading up to a sketch, in the last 
section, of an alternative solution to the paradox.
7. Shape, Aspects and the Will
The Constancy Claim is, prima facie, very surprising, in particular 
with respect to shape. For surely, changes from seeing two profiles 
to seeing a vase, for example, are changes in apparent shape. This 
is certainly how the Gestaltists treated them, and this seems, intui-
tively, right. The official justification for insisting that in all cases of 
aspect switching, apparent shape remains constant turns on the 
idea that aspect change is subject to the will, and that shape per-
ception is not. Here are some comments on this topic.
What Kohler does not deal with is the fact that one may look at figure 
2 [the double cross] in this way or that is that the aspect is,  at least to a 
certain extent, subject to the will. (RPP I, §971)
Now, in fact, Kohler was of course perfectly aware of the fact that 
‘attitude’ as he put it could influence which organization was seen. 
But he thought of this as an incidental, causal feature, which 
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worked by effecting changes in the brain of the kind that might be 
brought about spontaneously. And this is what Wittgenstein is 
really objecting to, as he makes clear in the following passage.
…. I mean voluntariness seems to me (but why?) not to be a mere ad-
dition as if one were to say:  “This movement can, as matter of experi-
ence, also be brought about in this way.” That is to say, it is essential 
that one can say ‘Now see it like this and `”Form an image of”… (RPP 
I, 899)
Why, then, is subjection to the will essential to aspects?  And why 
is their link with the will such that it excludes shape perception 
from being aspectual? Here are some answers he considers.
(a) “The aspect is subject to the will”. This isn’t an empirical proposi-
tion. It makes sense to say, “See this circle as a hole, not as a disc”, but 
it doesn’t make sense to say “See it as rectangle”, “See it as being red”. 
(RPP II, §545)
(b) That an aspect is subject to the will is not something that does not 
touch its very essence. For what would it be like, if we could see 
things arbitrarily as red or green. How in that case would one be able 
to learn to apply the words “red’ and “green”. First of all, in that case, 
there would be no such thing as ‘red object’,  but at most an object 
which is more easily seen red than green. (RPP I, §976)
 (c) Seeing an aspect and imaging are subject to the will.  There is such 
an order as “Imagine this” and also: “Now see the figure like this":  but 
not: “Now see this leaf green”. ( PI IIxi, 213)
Now, an immediate response to (a) is that yes, there is a limit 
to what the will can do here, but it is neither colour nor shape per 
se that are the problem. It might not make sense to ask someone to 
try to see something that looks round as rectangular, but that 
doesn’t mean it never makes sense to say: ‘try to see this as rectan-
gular’. This is indeed something one might say if the shape of the 
ground is rectangular and one thinks one’s interlocutor isn’t aware 
of the shape precisely because it is the ground rather than the fig-
ure. Similarly, turning to (b), it might not make sense to exhort 
some to try to see something that looks red  as green, but it might 
make sense to ask him to try to see something that looks blue, or 
grey, as green, if one thinks, for example, that background colours 
are affecting his perception. It might not work, of course, but it is 
not a senseless undertaking. Finally, with respect to (c), an intui-
tive response would be, well, in the sense in which subjection to 
the will would make learning about objective colour impossible, it 
would also make learning to detect objective vases impossible. 
However, there is also a sense, for both, in which there is nothing 
threatening to the objectivity of a property if there is a link be-
tween perceiving it and willability. For example, one might say 
‘try to see this as green, because that is the colour it really is and 
your perception is distorted by background colours’.
The idea that the willability of aspects excludes shape percep-
tion from counting as aspectual because it makes no sense to ex-
hort someone to try to see a shape is not, then, very promising. 
Intuitively, what matters here is not whether or not it makes sense 
to ask someone to try, but whether it makes sense to actually try, 
and, in particular, what explains the success or failure of any such 
attempt. In these terms, I think Wittgenstein’s central intuition is 
that with respect to shape and colour and other properties of the 
world out there, the explanation of whether or not we succeed in 
seeing them is due, at least in part, to the way the world is: and, 
what’s more, that this fact should show up in the account we give 
of the phenomenology of perceptual experience.  And he holds 
that there is something about organizational aspects that requires 
a different type of explanation. What we do not have yet is a clear 
account of why and in what sense this might be so. 
This is where I think advances made in psychology can be of 
some help, though they also raise new problems. To get there, I 
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want to pick up on a hint we find in Wittgenstein of another way 
of looking at the link between the will and aspects, which is, po-
tentially, more promising. Suppose, with Wittgenstein, that there is 
a constitutive link between aspectual seeing and the will. An im-
mediate question is: how does the will get into ‘seeing as’ in the 
first place? This is especially pressing for Wittgenstein, for his 
chief reason for agreeing with Gestaltists that aspectual seeing is 
not interpretation is that ‘seeing is a state’ in particular a state of 
consciousness, where the mark of such states is that they have 
genuine duration, whereas interpreting, in contrast, is an activity 
(RPP II, §43). 
There is an intuitive response to the question, namely that the 
will is integral to the experience of aspect changes in virtue of the 
role of attention. It would, I think, be an exaggeration to say that 
Wittgenstein developed this line of thinking in much detail, but it 
is there, and there is every reason to think he would have been 
sympathetic to pursuing it. 
First, re attention and activity:
Attention is dynamic, not static—one would like to say. I begin by 
comparing attention to gazing but that is not what I call attention;  and 
now I want to say that it is impossible that one should attend statically. 
(RPP II, §512 (Z. 673))
Second, re this activity and aspect changes:
Now one says: I can take lines together in copying, but I can also do 
so by means of attention… (RP I, §1115) 
When I see a change of aspect, I am occupied with the object.
I am occupied with what I am now noticing, with what strikes me. 
In that respect, change of aspect is like an action.
It is a paying of attention. (LW, §§14-15)
We can produce a change of aspect, and it can also occur against our 
will.
Like our gaze, it can follow our will. (LW, §612)
Admittedly, this is not a lot to go on. But I propose to read these 
comments as putting forward for further examination the follow-
ing suggestion. The way in which activity gets into the experience 
of seeing is via the activity of attending to objects; and the subjec-
tion of aspects to the will is in some way linked to the active na-
ture of attention. The questions now are, what exactly this might 
mean, and how, if at all, this might help with the idea that objec-
tive shape perception and aspectual ingredients in perception 
should be sharply distinguished. Before addressing this question 
directly, and relating it to the paradox and a potential solution to 
it, I want to have before us a brief account of some of the key 
changes, relative to Kohler, in the way psychologists now ap-
proach figure/ground segmentation and its relation to attention.
8. The Psychological Turn and the Role of Attention
Current psychological approaches to organizational phenomena 
invariably begin with the Gestaltists’ phenomenological descrip-
tions and ceteris paribus ‘laws’, before digging in ‘deeper’, into the 
computational solutions. As Stephen Palmer presents it, the phe-
nomenological gestalt laws deliver generalizations about the 
properties of stimuli that, all things being equal, will yield one 
rather than another organization. This is where principles of 
grouping fit in, for example the ‘principle of proximity’ which says 
that elements that are closer together tend to be perceived as be-
longing together; or the ‘principle of similarity’ which says that 
items with similar properties, e.g. same colour, tend to be grouped 
together. And many others. These laws do not, however, address 
the question of why these principles hold. Another thing lacking, 
and this is what is important for Palmer, is an account of how they 
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get implemented. Or, rather, the Gestaltists appealed to the dy-
namical working of the brain to answer both questions and this is 
what is rejected in current accounts.
In current work, in response to the ‘why’ question, psycholo-
gists often rely on evolutionary ecological appeals to the way the 
world is. By and large things of the same colour are part of a single 
unit in nature and so forth. As to the second, ‘how’ question, the 
major revolution, from the perspective of psychology, lies here. It 
is now taken for granted that the ‘how’ question is an information 
processing question, answers to which will appeal, at least in part, 
to derivations of progressively sophisticated representations from 
a representation of the distribution of light intensities on the ret-
ina. 
Before turning to the potential significance, for Wittgenstein, of 
current answers to the ‘how’ question, it will be useful to have be-
fore us the following state-of-the art introductory summary of the 
relation between gestalt phenomena and attention, as conceived of 
within this new framework.
Figure-ground segmentation is the process by which the visual sys-
tem organizes a visual scene into figures and their background. This is 
one of the most important visual processes because figure-ground 
distinctions are fundamental to the visual perception of objects and to 
visuomotor behaviour…An important yet unresolved issue concerns 
the relation between figure-ground segmentation and attention…. 
Many modern theories have assumed that figure-ground segmenta-
tion operates pre-attentively to deliver the perceptual units to which 
focal attention is allocated for further processing…. Although this 
view has been widely accepted, researchers have also suggested that 
deliberate fixation or spatial attention …can influence figure ground 
organization. Gibson (1994) showed that fixation location can contrib-
ute to figure-ground segmentation.  Baylis and Driver (1995) examined 
performance on a contour-matching task with ambiguous figures and 
showed that endogenous attention influences figure-ground assign-
ment; their experiments suggested that exogenous attention did not 
influence figure ground performance. However,  some recent resear-
ch…using the same contour matching task with similar ambiguous 
figures, showed that exogenous attention can influence figure-ground 
assignment, provided the exogenous cues are located inside the 
figure-ground display. … (Kimchi and Peterson 2008, 660)
How would this way of posing questions have affected Witt-
genstein’s approach to the problems he was concerned with?  On 
one view, we can say in advance that it would not and could not 
have helped. Wittgenstein repeatedly says that his puzzles are 
conceptual, not causal, and it might be claimed that all of this ap-
peal to information processing is exactly akin to the appeal to 
physiology to explain gestalt phenomena. Here is what he has to 
say about the latter: 
Imagine a physiological explanation of this experience. Let it be this: 
when we look at the figure, our eyes scan it repeatedly, always follow-
ing a particular path. This path corresponds to a particular periodic 
movement of the eyeballs. It is possible to jump from one such pattern 
to another and for the two to alternate (double cross). Certain patterns 
of movement are physiologically impossible, hence I cannot see the 
duck-rabbit as the picture of the head of a rabbit superimposed on the 
head of a duck, nor can I see the schematic cube as the picture of two 
interpenetrating prisms. And so on.—Let's assume that this is the 
explanation.—"Yes, now I know that it is a kind of seeing." You have 
now introduced a new, a physiological criterion for seeing. And this 
can screen the old problem from view, but not solve it.—The purpose 
of this remark is to bring before your view what happens when a 
physiological explanation is offered. The psychological concept hangs 
out of reach of this explanation. (PI IIxi, 212c) 4
Now it is indeed possible to take the view that Wittgenstein 
would have regarded all talk of information processing in a simi-
lar way, as introducing a ‘new criterion of seeing’.5 In particular, it 
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might be held, he would have claimed that all talk of information 
processing still leaves the ‘psychological concept hanging out of 
reach of explanation’. My own view is that not only is this kind of 
blanket response a mistake, but, also, that there is no reason to be-
lieve that Wittgenstein would have made it.
! First, very generally: while there is an obvious 
switch in concept-type between our everyday psychological con-
cepts and the concepts used in physiology, the same cannot be 
said, at least not as immediately or obviously, about information 
processing explanations of perception. After all, the concepts used 
in such theories, ‘representation’, ‘computation’, ‘segmenting’, 
‘comparing’ and so forth are all prima facie psychological  (as op-
posed to physiological) concepts. So work is needed to in order to 
show that the way psychologists use them in explaining 
percpetion involves a change of subject matter, via a change of 
concept.
The question of the relation between the concepts used in vi-
sion science, say, and our ordinary concepts of seeing is one, if not 
the conceptual issue we need to deal with now (an issue which, in 
its current form, simply did not exist at the time Wittgenstein was 
writing). It might be that Wittgenstein would have been per-
suaded by claims to the effect that the way psychologists use these 
concepts introduces a new concept of vision (the so-called ‘two-
concept’ claim). But it is equally plausible that he would not have. 
In particular, with respect to the specific problems we are consid-
ering, an alternative view is that he would have examined these 
developments in psychology and judged them on their specific mer-
its, in order to see whether the new framework (a) helps to dis-
solve what he took to be confusions in the way Kohler approached 
gestalt phenomena, and (b) helps with the particular question of 
what do with organizational properties of experience. There is 
nothing in Wittgenstein, as I read him, that encourages ascribing 
to him an a priori rejection of such an approach, and from now on I 
shall proceed on the assumption that he would have at least been 
open to seeing what if anything it might deliver.
There are two specific features of current psychological theo-
rizing about organizational properties and their relation to atten-
tion which would, I suggest, be of particular interest to Wittgen-
stein. I introduce them and the questions they raise in this section, 
and in the final section exploit them in sketching a solution to the 
original paradox.
One way of registering the enormity of change in psychologi-
cal theorizing is to note that Wittgenstein’s main target, Kohler’s 
New Object Claim, has simply disappeared from view. Any talk of 
internal phenomenal objects has melted away to be replaced by 
talk of visual processes and activities of segmenting and comput-
ing over representations. It is representations all the way down, as 
it were, with the only objects that enter the story being the external 
objects perceived.
Kohler gave the New Object Claim two roles. The first was to 
explain the phenomenal sense in which everything has changed. 
Second, more ideologically, he used it to counter the introspection-
ists’ claim that what has changed is due solely to interpretation. 
One major question is: how would Wittgenstein’s understanding 
of the paradox, let alone his solution to it, look relative to potential 
explanations of sameness and difference now on offer in psychol-
ogy, which, like his own, though for different reasons, eschew all 
talk of internal new objects?
This is one of the questions I take up in the next section. Turn-
ing now to the question of how, in particular, organizational prop-
erties of experience should be dealt with, much turns, I suggest, on 
the way attentional control is currently thought about. According 
to Wittgenstein, as we saw, the relation between gestalt switches 
and attention is not merely causal, contra Kohler. This seems right, 
but it is very difficult to explain how this could be so when we 
have a picture according to which that which is purely visual (in 
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the particular sense of not being a matter of interpretation) is, from 
the subject’s perspective, constitutively passive and independent 
of the will, as Kohler had it. Something is wrong with this picture. 
We need a way of making sense, theoretically, of what is available 
to us on everyday reflection—the idea of a necessary link between 
the phenomenology of experience and the will which is, at the 
same time, consistent with the phenomenology not being due to 
the exercise of interpretational capacities. 
It is here, I suggest, that attention and information processing 
theories thereof come into their own. According to the psycholo-
gists Daniel Kahneman and Avishai Henik the ‘...enduring fascina-
tion with the problem of attention can perhaps be traced to the na-
ture of selective attention as a pure act of will (James 1890) which 
controls experience’(Kahneman and Henik, 1981). The concept of 
attention they employ, which has its origins in William James, and 
is in widespread use in current information processing approaches 
to attention, is one on which (conscious, personal level) attention 
is, at the same time, selection of information for further process-
ing. John Campbell, in his paper ‘Wittgenstein and Attention’, 
suggests that we should treat the various information processing 
accounts of the mechanisms involved in such selection and further 
processing as the non-conscious sub-personal cognitive compo-
nents of what the subject does when attending (Campbell 2000); or, 
in the terms of the above quotation, sub-personal ingredients in 
attention, where the latter is conceived of, essentially, as a possible 
expression of will.
This seems to me in general to be the right kind of approach to 
attention. Its importance is not restricted to gestalt phenomena 
and to the role of attention in controlling them. The concept of at-
tention is, arguably, the central ‘bridge concept’ currently in play 
in linking personal level everyday psychological descriptions of 
perception with information processing accounts thereof, along 
the lines just sketched. From the perspective of our puzzle, 
though, the question is whether and how this way of looking at 
attention provides for a satisfactory cashing of the specific intui-
tion Wittgenstein is wrestling with, the idea that there is some-
thing different, essentially, about the explanation we should give 
of various gestalt properties of the experience, on the one hand, 
and colour and shape, on the other, and that this is linked, in some 
way, to the fact that attention is subject to the will. 
I begin the next section with a sketch of an answer to the latter 
question, and then turn to a more general reflection on how the 
paradox looks relative to current psychological approaches to per-
ception.
9. Revisiting the Conceptual Turn: 
The Shape of A Possible Solution
Consider the following rendering of the Two-Tier Claim. In ac-
counting for the phenomenology of object perception, we must 
single out a layer of phenomenology that is distinct from the phe-
nomenology due to the apparent properties of perceived 3D ob-
jects, in the following sense. There is an activity of border assign-
ing, idiosyncratic to the way the visual system works, which 
shows up in phenomenology as a ‘belonging together’, which is 
subject to various kinds of attentional interventions. The phe-
nomenological manifestation of this is indeed distinct in kind from 
the manifestation in experience of presented properties of objects, 
e.g. their shape, precisely in being a manifestation in phenomenol-
ogy of a psychological process or activity, thereby introducing a de-
gree of absence of transparency into the phenomenology.  That is, 
the phenomenological properties are not due to the way the world 
is taken to be, but to the way the visual system operates.
If we take something like this line, it allows us to expand on 
Wittgenstein’s objection to Kohler’s New Object Claim as follows. 
The ‘belonging together’ in phenomenology is radically different 
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from the way perceived colours and shapes show up precisely in 
not being a showing up in phenomenology of an apparent prop-
erty of an object, new or old, but, rather, a phenomenological as-
pect of experience which is due to the kinds of activity involved in 
generating the experience, a manifestation in experience of how we 
succeed in alighting on objects in perception. But that this is so is 
hard to see because of the dominance in our philosophical and 
psychological theorizing about phenomenology of the transpar-
ency thesis, which says that the phenomenal character of experi-
ences is due to the apparent properties of the object experienced. 
Philosophers then argue (a) about the metaphysical status of these 
perceived entities, in particular whether these are sensations or 
ordinary external objects; and (b) about whether transparency is 
due to the representational content of an experience or due to the 
properties of the object that is a constituent of the experience. But 
with respect to organizational properties, appeal to objects and 
their apparent properties is neither here nor there, as they are as-
pects of experience which accrue to it in virtue of the kind of activ-
ity involved in perceiving. 
It might appear that, in principle, this approach would have 
been open for formulation at the time Wittgenstein was writing, 
and that vision science is not adding anything new. After all, it 
might be claimed, there are echoes here of various ‘adverbial theo-
ries’ of sensation, but restricted to a specific subset of phenomenal 
properties—those not due to properties of objects perceived—and 
this is a kind of move that is available independently of any ap-
peal to information processing. However, while there are indeed 
such echoes, the point of introducing appeal to activity here does, 
in fact, rely specifically on a kind of appeal to information process-
ing that was not available to Wittgenstein. If we think ourselves 
back to the framework Wittgenstein was assuming, any reference 
to a process or activity of ‘taking together’, considered as a psy-
chological process, could only come in on a personal level. But this 
is too late, for the phenomenology we are talking about. The latter 
is something that from the subject’s point of view is fixed prior to 
any explicit moves of anything that might be called a ‘taking to-
gether by the subject’. This is what motivates Kohler’s Pure Vision 
Claim, and Wittgenstein is alive to this motivation, which leads 
him to reject the introspectionists’ claim that organizational as-
pects enter into phenomenology via the subject’s interpretation of 
pure visual data. However, if we think of the modified activity as a 
sub-personal one that delivers phenomenology, for the subject, we 
avoid this problem—there is a sense in which the organization is 
‘given with the given’, from the subject’s perspective. Or rather, 
we do so in a way consistent with Wittgenstein’s main intuitions 
here, only if we can, at the same time, establish a link with some-
thing the subject herself does, in virtue of which it is right to speak 
of organizational aspects as modifications of a subject’s activity. It 
is here, I suggest, that appeal to attention, as currently conceived 
of, plays a critical role, both in providing an explanation of what is 
going on, and in suggesting a diagnosis of why we are puzzled.
 According to the picture sketched in the previous section, at-
tending to objects, something the subject does, often involves and 
always can involve, the sub-personal activity of border assign-
ment—this is part of the process of selecting information for fur-
ther processing. In this sense, the ‘taking together’ is a modifica-
tion of the activity of attending. Because it is done sub-personally, 
when we reflect on it and notice it we are baffled, and tend to con-
vert the property into a property of objects rather than one of ac-
tivity, and look around for an object to assign it to. Once we have 
the idea of an activity with sub-personal components, though, we 
can do justice to the idea that organizational phenomena are in 
some sense more primitive than, or phenomenologically prior to, 
anything we actively do on the personal level—being the product 
of the workings of sub-personal information processing mecha-
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nisms—and, at the same time, essentially subject to the will, as 
Wittgenstein says, in virtue of their link with attention. 
Of course we cannot directly ascribe any such view to Witt-
genstein. The suggestion is, rather, that the phenomena he is 
alighting on are important at least partly because they point the 
way towards the need for solutions only made possible with the 
framework of current ways of thinking of perception (broadly 
speaking).
So much for the way in which attention might be appealed to 
in explaining the different status of organizational properties of 
experience. I want to end where we began, with the paradox, and 
with the question of how developments in psychology might have 
influenced Wittgenstein’s approach to a solution.
The paradox was: ‘What is incomprehensible is that nothing, 
and yet everything has changed, after all’? How does it look when 
we have in play current approaches to vision?  Well, if we adopt 
the account just sketched of organizational properties and go on to 
use it as a first step in a solution to the paradox, we get the follow-
ing claim. What changes, prior to the reflective awareness of a ge-
stalt switch, is the manifestation in the phenomenology of object-
seeing of the way in which the visual system arranges boundaries, 
something over which we have (limited) control. (The Prior 
Change Claim). 
What about that which stays the same?  What should we say, in 
particular, about the Constancy Claim?  Earlier I distinguished the 
Prior Sameness Claim from post hoc readings of the claim that eve-
rything remains the same, and suggested that Wittgenstein ap-
pears to have been committed to the former, as part of his initial 
objection to the New Object Claim—postulating a new object fal-
sifies a basic ingredient in the phenomenology. Suppose we rid 
ourselves of Kohler’s version of the New Object Claim, by appeal 
to the framework we used for interpreting the Prior Change 
Claim. Is there any justification, psychological or philosophical for 
holding onto the Prior Sameness Claim?
 Certainly, as psychologists currently see it, when I switch from 
one figure/ground segmentation to another, I am attending first to 
one object and then another. In this sense, the pictures used as 
demonstrations are misleading. It is true that there is a picture in 
common when I flip from one to another, and perhaps even true 
that reference to it enters into an account of the phenomenology of 
each experience, pre- and post- switch. But the object that matters, 
from a psychological perspective, is the picture-object, one cross 
rather than another, a vase rather than a double profile. It is this 
kind of object that is relevant to understanding how the visual sys-
tem works in real life. The taking together by the visual system is 
the first step in singling out one area of the visual field rather than 
another as an object. There is no prior common object of attention. 
Rather, the ‘object’ in common is something I single out as such 
post hoc, correlatively with noticing the change in organizational 
aspect. 
 Note, the objects that change, on this account, are real world 
objects, and not a special brand of phenomenal object, as envis-
aged by Kohler, not ‘new’ in that sense. Part of what makes this 
rendering of the New Object Claim possible is the conception of 
organizational properties as upshots of information processing 
activity, the aim of which is to deliver information about objects 
out there. Wittgenstein’s theoretical objection to Kohler’s version 
does not get a grip here. All that remains is the phenomenal intui-
tion, as expressed by the paradox. But once we have the real world 
reading of the New Object Claim in place, I suggest, the urge to 
find a real phenomenal commonality of shape or object between 
the experiences pre- and post- switch also recedes. It has no more 
phenomenological compellingness than the post hoc solution. For, 
on the face of it, the phenomenological intuition expressed by the 
paradox leaves it open that it is the phenomenology of the second 
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sense of ‘see’, aspect seeing, that we need to account for when 
doing justice to the ‘no change’ ingredient in the paradox, rather 
than the phenomenology of the experiences that precede it. If we 
adopt this post hoc reading of the sameness intuition, the solution 
to the paradox takes something like the following form. There is 
prior change, in organizational aspects, but only post hoc sameness, 
constructed as apart of the experience of an aspect dawning. The 
Constancy Claim is rejected.
This is more or less the reverse of the solution one might plau-
sibly attribute to Wittgenstein on the basis of the passages in The 
Investigations discussed earlier on. However much of the point of 
his distinction between the two senses of ‘see’ is retained. The ‘half 
thinking, half seeing’, referred to by the second sense of ‘see’, is 
expanded to include in its content not only the noticing of a phe-
nomenal similarity to one rather than another class of objects, but 
also the ‘noticing’ of a common shape, constant between changes 
in organization. The difference between these noticings is that the 
noticing of the phenomenal similarity is a noticing of features 
made phenomenally salient by the organizational properties of the 
preceding experiences, whereas the phenomenal constancy of the 
shape, and a common object to go with it, are only constructed 
post hoc. 
 Would Wittgenstein have been happy with this kind of solu-
tion?  It is not clear to me that this is something the texts resolve. 
But one thing we can say for certain is that contrary to what he 
supposed, at least some of the puzzles he was grappling with, in 
particular Kohler’s version of the New Object Claim, were due to, 
or shaped by, the youth of the science at the time he was writing. 
That is, there are ways out of his conceptual puzzle, more or less 
the reverse of what he might be plausibly read as suggesting, that 
are made available due to empirical developments in psychology. 
But there are two major respects in which I take this kind of appeal 
to information processing to be in line with general Wittgenstein-
ian themes. The first is that it provides for the kind of non-
reductive demystification he was generally after in his account of 
phenomenology—in particular, all references to inner phenomenal 
objects are dispensed with. The second is that it incorporates the 
idea, much emphasized in On Certainty, that our concepts are 
permeable to empirical discoveries and evolve with them. The 
general idea that progress in science throws up new conceptual 
questions is certainly not alien to Wittgenstein’s thought. At the 
time he was writing, though, this was hard to see with respect to 
psychological concepts because not much progress had been made 
and there was so much conceptual confusion. I think he would 
have regarded the information processing theories as an advance 
of a kind that both reduces confusion and can be appealed to in 
solving particular puzzles, the paradox being a prime example of 
such. 
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1 Readers interested in a view as diametrically opposed to mine as 
it is possible to be, both generally and specifically with respect to 
vision, should look at Peter Hacker’s ‘The Relevance of Wittgen-
stein’s Philosophy of Psychology to the Psychological Sciences’.
2 For attention to these passages in Kohler I am indebted to Janette 
Dinishak’s illuminating PhD thesis on Wittgenstein and Kohler, 
2008, published online.
3  For an excellent account of this strand in Wittgenstein’s treat-
ment of aspect seeing, see (Budd 1989, 90-99).
4 For attention to the significance of this passage in setting up the 
issues discussed in this section I am indebted to one of the jour-
nal’s anonymous reviewers.
5 This is the approach taken by Peter Hacker in ‘The Relevance of 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology to the Psychological Sci-
ences’.
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